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This paper investigates governance reform which aims to ‘move the state’ closer to people, arguing that 
greater attention needs to be paid to two questions: how does political decentralisation affect the ways in 
which authority is exercised? And what spaces does it leave open for poor people’s agency? It focuses on 
West Bengal, an Indian innovator of decentralisation through panchayati raj (‘rule by local councils’) in the 
late 1970s, investigating the everyday practices through which rural political space was being managed 
through in-depth qualitative evidence gathered from two panchayats towards the end of the Left Front 
government’s long rule (1977–2011). This work indicates the ways in which patronage, coercion and 
surveillance were melded by those exercising political power in the Bengali countryside, and the limited 
political opportunities which these practices left open to the poor. The ostensibly democratic structures 
of panchayati raj thus coexisted with the informal exercise of power and the reproduction of new forms 
of ascribed political identity for poorer and marginal groups. This in turn raises critical questions about 
programmes of governance reform being pursued across the global South.
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Since the 1990s, international development interventions, driven largely by agencies 
such as the World Bank, have aimed to transform the actions and capabilities of  states 
across the global South. As part of  a broader agenda of  good governance, states have 
been strongly encouraged to decentralise, with the assumption being that ‘moving 
the state’ (Heller, 2001) physically and conceptually closer to its citizens is an essential 
part of  ‘making government work for poor people’ (World Bank, 2000). This paper 
draws on a wider project of  comparative research in India that has sought to investi-
gate the practical efects of  decentralisation in Kerala and West Bengal for poor and 
marginalised rural citizens’ democratic engagement. By looking at these states, where 
experiments with decentralisation have long and indigenously driven histories, our 
research has sought to illustrate the contradictions and tensions of  conscious attempts 
to engineer ‘empowered participatory governance’. In doing so, we join with other 
critical scholars who seek to counter narrowly instrumental approaches to building 
participatory institutions (Li, 2007; Mohan, 2007; Robins et al., 2008) and to under-
stand the complexities of  their potential contributions to poor people’s substantive 
citizenship (Harriss et al., 2004; Heller, 2009).
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The speciic questions which this paper addresses are, how does political decen-
tralisation afect the ways in which authority is exercised? And what spaces does this 
leave open for poor people’s agency? Both questions fundamentally concern inclusive 
citizenship and empowered participatory governance – key themes within good-gover-
nance debates – but here we foreground the interplay between political decentralisa-
tion and everyday practices of  rule as they are experienced ‘on the ground’. We do 
so to deliberately move our analytical attention away from the speciic programmes, 
events and organisations designed to promote citizen participation, and focus instead 
on the social contexts within which these ‘invited spaces’ (cornwall, 2004) are located. 
Such invited spaces are always ‘etched with the traces of  existing relationships of  
power’ (Robins et al., 2008, 1072), and our shift in perspective aims to bring these 
relationships into view.
Viewing political authority and agency ‘from below’
The irst task of  our paper is to trace out the history through which participatory 
governance institutions have evolved in West Bengal, and the ways in which they have 
embedded open (and often violent) competition and state-backed welfare programmes 
as integral parts of  local political space in the Bengali countryside. Our understanding 
here is informed not only by previous research on West Bengal itself, but also by a 
broader sensitivity to Jonathon Fox’s ‘political construction’ approach which ‘focuses 
on recursive cycles of  interaction between state and societal actors to account for the 
uneven emergence of  representative societal organization under less-than-democratic 
conditions’ (Fox, 1996, 1090). Placing decentralisation initiatives within this historical 
context provides a thicker account of  how far they can contribute towards substantial 
democracy, which we deine here as ‘movement towards people’s capacity actually to 
make use of  democratic means to produce democratic ends’ (Harriss et al., 2004, 14). 
Our shift in perspective has an additional consequence for our analysis: that formal 
institutions and practices should not be privileged over and above other aspects of  the 
local political landscape. Here we briely explore how our approach is informed by 
other work that views political authority and agency ‘from below’.
christian Lund (2006a; 2006b) outlines why this shift in perspective matters for 
our irst question around the exercise of  authority. For him, public authority is the 
ability to ‘deine and enforce collectively binding decisions on society’ with some 
degree of  legitimacy (Lund, 2006a, 676). This is not the exclusive preserve of  formal 
institutions but a contingent and emergent property, and as a result all institutions 
have to continually perform their ‘stateliness’ in order to ensure that their claims to 
authority gain local recognition. This in turn means that various everyday activities 
become central to institutions’ reproduction: paying attention to ritual and symbolic 
practices that ‘naturalise’ their rule, intervening to settle public disputes, asserting 
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control over a speciic geographical area, and collecting taxes and dues. For those 
over whom rule is being practised, the latter three activities each interlink the experi-
ence of  being subject to coercive power with the establishment of  a relationship of  
belonging or (quasi-)citizenship, regardless how ‘oicial’ the status of  these exchanges 
is. For example, ‘taxes’ may take the form of  structured and normalised bribes, and 
leaders’ need to demonstrate community management may result in them actively 
seeking out disputes over which they can make binding judgments (Lund, 2006a, 676). 
Public authority is therefore continually performed, and this performance involves an 
element of  improvisation: leaders engage in processes of  ‘bricolage’, the adaptation 
of  locally meaningful symbols and practices, to shore up their status and legitimacy 
(Lund, 2006b, 692; see also cleaver, 2012).
This approach to authority as contingent and performed, with its even-handed 
treatment of  formal and informal local institutions, draws our attention to what are 
often remarkably resilient local idioms and practices of  rule. For Blom Hansen, the 
formal state and legal system in India do ‘not exercise any monopoly of  legitimate 
violence’ (2005, 170) in practice, but are intertwined with two informal modes of  
exercising authority: that of  ‘big men’, and that practised collectively by ‘the commu-
nity’, enforced in particular through crowd violence. It is the ‘big man’ (or dada) that 
is of  particular interest here:1 these individuals actively build their reputations for 
dispute mediation and practical eicacy, often achieved through short-circuiting the 
operation of  formal governmental systems (cf. Brass, 1997; Price and Ruud, 2010). 
Their authority is asserted in deliberately performative ways: through public displays 
of  their generosity, of  their position ‘above’ the law, and of  their capacity to mete out 
retribution. For these authors, informal structures of  power are therefore not mere 
‘shadows’ (High et al., 2006) or residual forms, but are constitutive of  how authority 
is enacted and experienced on a day-to-day basis.
This ongoing presence of  informal authority raises important questions about 
India’s potential to enact governance reform. For James Manor (2000) or Ananth 
Pur (2007) informal authority in rural India – expressed through caste councils or 
political ixers – lourishes today precisely because it is functionally useful to India’s 
democracy: it translates policy in ways acceptable to local custom, or ills in for gaps 
in state capacity, but is ultimately subservient to formal institutions and legal power. 
For Blom Hansen, as for chatterjee (2004; 2008), its presence poses a more funda-
mental challenge to the formal state. It produces lasting ‘paralegal’ arrangements that 
‘lead over time to substantial redeinitions of  property and law within the actually 
existing modern state’ (chatterjee, 2004, 75), and set limits to ‘the possibilities of  social 
reform and accountability through legislation’ (Blom Hansen, 2005, 191). We return to 
1 The exercise of  crowd violence is vitally important in understanding communal politics (Blom Hansen, 2004; 
2005), ‘institutionalised riot systems’ (Brass, 1997) and their relation to formal elections in India, but is of  less direct 
relevance to the everyday expression of  authority addressed here.
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these debates in our conclusions, but also note that participatory governance reforms 
themselves bring into being new political boundaries and practices that require new 
(and inherently spatialised) performances on the part of  citizens and their representa-
tives (Lemanski, 2017; see also Bénit-Gbafou and Katsura, 2014). Accordingly, we see 
‘top-down’ projects of  governance reform as not merely meeting resistance when they 
seek to restrict the scope of  informal practices and institutions, but as inadvertently 
new creating spaces in which informal authority is produced in dynamic forms.
Within our second question, what spaces does decentralisation provide for poor and marginalised 
people to express their political agency?, we consider the ways in which a locally constituted 
political sphere and the active presence of  informal politics are central in allowing us ‘to 
depict the way in which authority is encountered from below’ (Webster and Engberg-
Pedersen, 2002, 24). Understandably, whilst the literature recognises informal authority 
igures as leaders who can be central to the lives of  poor and marginalised citizens, 
they are often viewed negatively. For Wood (2003), being subject to forms of  patronage 
and dependency is a ‘Faustian bargain’ that poor people must undertake in return for 
limited livelihood security. In the absence of  other reliable ways of  managing risk, they 
enter into informal economic and non-economic relationships with local power holders, 
which themselves reproduce socially regressive norms of  authority. This is a constriction 
of  their agency, in terms of  their scope both to act and to represent themselves indepen-
dently. Bénit-Gbafou (2011), however, warns against simplistic a priori judgments against 
informal authority, noting that clientelism and local democracy are closely intertwined 
in practice. First, and particularly when viewed from the perspective of  the poor, the 
actions and sources of  authority of  the traditional patron may not be distinct from 
those of  formal political representatives. Second, clientelism and ideas of  decentralised 
or participatory governance justify themselves in the same normative terms: that there 
should be a closer and more personal relationship between clients/citizens and power 
holders, and that public policy should be open to local negotiation and adaptation (Bénit-
Gbafou, 2011, 458). Intentional programmes of  participatory governance reform there-
fore not only are undertaken within an environment in which informal authority igures 
and practices are already present, but also promote practices which are likely to blur into 
forms of  political clientelism.
The practical value to the poor of  engaging with informal power within India is 
disputed. Whilst de Wit and Berner (2009) largely follow Wood (2003) in seeing the urban 
poor’s engagement with ‘vertical’ patronage relationships as a forced response to survival 
needs, chatterjee sees instead a productive space in which ‘people in most of  the world 
are devising new ways in which they can choose to be governed’ (chatterjee, 2004, 77). 
For him, contemporary India exempliies neither republican citizenship nor unaltered 
patron–client relations (chatterjee, 2011, 306), but rather a ‘political society’. Within this, 
people are improvising new forms of  political community through tactical engagement 
with the mechanisms of  the modern state (elections, and various state programmes to 
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develop its ‘target populations’) and appeals to elements of  moral economy and primor-
dial identity. chatterjee therefore has a much more positive reading of  informal power, but 
within his work its actual impact on poor and marginal groups is only sketchily outlined. 
For example, he argues that the gains made by slum dwellers through political society have 
been reversed since the 1990s as the middle classes have recaptured the contemporary 
Indian city (chatterjee, 2004, 139–47), and that some marginalised groups ‘represent an 
outside beyond the boundaries of  political society’ (chatterjee, 2008, 61). However he 
does not explore in detail people’s responses to these reversals, or who may be excluded 
from political society and with what consequences. We wish to push this work further by 
understanding how intentional governance reforms reshape their poor people’s identity 
and scope to express their political agency.
There are therefore good theoretical arguments to withhold quick normative 
judgements about governance reform in the abstract, and instead to undertake a more 
grounded analysis of  the everyday relationships that such reform opens up between 
local power holders, the poor and the state. Accordingly, we examine West Bengal’s 
experience of  rural decentralization within its wider historical context, noting the 
form of  political space this has established. Our empirical work then looks at how this 
space is managed, taking seriously the challenge which informal authority poses for 
intentional programmes of  governance reform. Similarly, when we evaluate its efects 
on poor people’s expression of  political agency, we do so with pragmatic questions in 
mind: how does reform interlink with informal practices, and what is their value to 
the poor?
Governance in rural West Bengal: investigating 
decentralisation in a party-politicised space
West Bengal has a political history of  interest to those studying (or designing) 
programmes of  governance reform in the global South. From 1977 to 2011 the Left 
Front government, a coalition led by the communist Party of  India, Marxist (cPI(M) 
hereafter), was re-elected for seven consecutive terms, making it India’s longest incum-
bent State-level government. It was also an early innovator in ‘deepening democracy’, 
setting up a system of  elected rural local councils (panchayats) in 1978 that pre-dated 
India’s constitutional requirement for States to establish such institutions by a decade 
and a half. From the outset, empowering the councils was closely intertwined with 
bolstering the rural support base of  the cPI(M): the initial impetus for decentralisa-
tion was partially about defending the party’s presence in the Bengali countryside,2 
2 The communists had won West Bengal’s State Assembly elections in 1967 and 1969, only to have direct rule 
imposed by New Delhi soon afterwards on the pretext of  restoring law and order. The quick establishment of  
elected panchayats in 1978 was therefore partially a defensive measure to produce an additional tier of  government 
within which the cPI(M) could remain active.
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but the panchayats quickly became central to the Left Front’s development vision 
(Mishra, 1991). They played a vital part in distributing lood relief  soon after the 1978 
elections, and particularly over its irst decade in oice, the cPI(M) also used them 
to implement signiicant tenancy registration and land reform drives, consolidating a 
rural lower-class power base in the process (see Kohli, 1987, for the ‘classic’ account 
of  the cPI(M)’s success in this period). After this initial radicalism, West Bengal’s 
panchayats were principally used as vehicles to implement national poverty alleviation 
programmes; as a result their lowest tier, the gram panchayats (village councils), became 
key sites of  state welfare distribution for many rural dwellers.
Although West Bengal’s panchayats continued to have limited iscal or policy 
autonomy,3 they steadily evolved as institutions over the remainder of  the Left Front’s 
term of  oice. Their position within representative democracy was ensured through 
holding regular panchayat elections every ive years, and council seats and chairs 
were later reserved for women and for historically marginalised groups, the Sched-
uled castes and Scheduled Tribes.4 Given the relatively large size of  West Bengal’s 
gram panchayats, there was further innovation to ensure participatory democracy at 
the ward level,5 and from the 1990s all wards were required to hold village open 
meetings (gram sangshads) to publicly debate panchayat annual development plans and 
expenditure. This was extended in 2003 with the establishment of  ward-level village 
development committees (gram unnayan samities) to boost local engagement with the 
panchayats: these were chaired by the local gram panchayat member but included the 
representation of  local opposition parties and NGOs. Panchayati raj therefore estab-
lished formal processes and spaces which were intended not only to ensure eicient 
implementation of  welfare measures, but also to allow some degree of  local control 
over rural development planning. From the outset, the cPI(M) explicitly linked its 
creation and management of  these spaces to its broader commitment to ruling in the 
interests of  the rural poor (Lieten, 1992; Bhattacharyya, 1999; Williams 2001): this was 
a discourse of  ‘discipline’, enforced by the party’s democratic centralism, and ‘devel-
opment’, grounded in efective implementation of  national development programmes 
3 Kerala undertook a more thorough iscal decentralisation, giving panchayats signiicant ‘untied’ resources (those 
not linked to speciic national welfare programmes), and encouraging them to make active use of  their own 
revenue-raising powers.
4 Scheduled castes incorporate former ‘untouchable’ (ritually ‘unclean’) castes, and Scheduled Tribes encompass 
indigenous peoples outside the Hindu–Muslim mainstream. These are government-deined categories intended 
to support historically disadvantaged groups, but there is a degree of  contention over both because they do not 
always match groups’ self-identiication or map neatly onto those actually sufering ritual/cultural discrimination.
5 West Bengal’s districts are large, with most exceeding 2.5 million inhabitants: rural areas are split into develop-
ment blocks (around 150,000 population), and further subdivided into gram panchayats (‘village councils’ of  around 
20,000 population). Unlike some other parts of  India, West Bengal’s gram panchayats are not single villages, but 
sizable clusters of  rural settlements. Typically, gram panchayats would be composed of  a dozen or more electoral 
wards: each might encompass a single village, or one or more smaller hamlets.
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(chatterjee et al., 1997) through which it claimed moral authority for its rule across 
West Bengal as a whole.
The story of  how the Left Front ultimately lost that moral authority at state level 
is told elsewhere (chatterjee, 2009; Bag, 2011; Bhattacharyya, 2016): our concern here 
is rather with the ways in which panchayat rule has changed local relationships between 
the state, political leaders and poor and marginalised groups in rural Bengal. The irst 
of  these has been to increase the ‘institutional surface area’ (Heller, 2009) of  the state: 
most rural dwellers are within a few kilometres’ walk of  their gram panchayat oice, and 
their own elected ward members and the ‘invited spaces’ of  participation in elections 
and village open meetings should be found even closer to their homes. Second, driven 
by struggles to control the panchayats through competitive elections, party politics has 
penetrated deeply into the everyday life of  the Bengali countryside. Unlike many 
other states in India, candidates within West Bengal’s panchayat elections are allowed 
to stand as representatives of  political parties. As a result, commentators drawing on 
ethnographic ieldwork conducted in the early 2000s noted that the political party 
had become ‘the elementary institution of  rural life in the State’ (chatterjee, 2009, 
43) and that ‘the organizational grid of  the political party [is] largely accepted as the 
chief  mediator, the central conduit, in the settling of  every village matter: private or 
public, individual or collective, familial or associational’ (Bhattacharyya, 2009, 68). 
This dominance of  political parties meant that even registering a voluntary associa-
tion or club would usually be impossible without party backing (Harrison, 2012).
Our empirical research aimed to deepen this work by understanding how rule was 
practised and experienced, and so adopted mixed-method qualitative research under-
taken over nine months in two case study panchayats in Birbhum District. To address 
our irst question, how is political authority established and exercised?, we conducted over 
twenty in-depth interviews with local resource persons (elected panchayat members, 
administrators, leading local political-party igures and traditional leaders) within 
each panchayat, extending to higher-level bureaucratic igures – such as the block 
development oicer – whose oices lay beyond the boundaries of  the panchayat. Inter-
views were supplemented by extensive ield observations which enabled us to see their 
conduct within and beyond the ‘invited spaces’ created by panchayat rule. To address 
the question how do poor people express their agency?, we worked with purposively sampled 
groups of  households from communities facing diferent forms of  marginalisation, 
again using participant observation and detailed interviews alongside focus groups to 
outline the strategies they deployed to extract beneits, or even a degree of  security, 
from local power brokers. This work focused on three wards within each panchayat 
identiied as containing high levels of  poverty. A brief  survey, measuring poverty and 
indicators of  political participation, was administered to all households in the selected 
wards (n > 800 for each panchayat), and from this a set of  ive poor neighbourhoods was 
identiied for detailed qualitative study, involving at least ten detailed household inter-
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views per neighbourhood. Here, respondents were purposively selected to be repre-
sentative of  the diferent levels of  participation/non-participation in key government 
projects and programmes within their communities. case-study based work cannot 
claim to statistically represent conditions across West Bengal, but rather to provoke 
analytical insights through detailed comparison,6 and here our pair of  panchayats were 
deliberately selected to relect broader patterns of  poverty and contrasting local party-
political histories. Using 2001 census data and 2008 panchayat election results, and 
guided by key informants, we choose panchayats with proportions of  disadvantaged 
communities close to district averages. One was controlled by the cPI(M), the other 
by the opposition; each was situated within a development block controlled by the 
same party, to avoid instances where panchayats were being deliberately undermined 
by block-level politicians.
The irst of  our panchayats was in Dubrajpur Block, which had remained a solid 
area of  cPI(M) support from 1977 to 2008. Older local party leaders active in struggles 
for land reform and tenancy registration in the Left Front’s early years, many of  
whom were from landowning families themselves despite their left-wing politics, had 
been supplanted by a new generation of  ‘party professionals’, associated more closely 
with the management of  the area’s new economic opportunities. These centred on 
the establishment of  a 630-megawatt thermal power station which had provided a 
boost to the local economy through construction work, direct employment in the plant 
and small businesses in its immediate vicinity and around the gram panchayat oice. 
The rival All India Trinamool congress (AITc),7 campaigning on issues including 
compensation for those displaced by the power plant, came within 5 per cent of  the 
cPI(M)’s vote in the 2008 panchayat elections; despite this declining support, which 
mirrored state-wide patterns, the cPI(M) still held all panchayat seats at the time of  
our study. By contrast, leadership of  our other panchayat in Mayureswar-I Block 
had repeatedly shifted between the congress (1977–83, 1993–2003) and the cPI(M) 
(1983–93, 2003–8), with the AITc–congress–BJP Alliance gaining control of  both 
the gram panchayat and Mayureswar-I Block council in the 2008 elections. The area’s 
economy remained exclusively dominated by agriculture, with leaders of  all local 
parties primarily being drawn from long-established landholding families, for whom 
landownership meant close engagement with – and the electoral support of  – ‘their’ 
labourers and tenants.
6 The validity of  our analytical insights was cross-checked irst with research participants themselves (via a return 
visit to the panchayats to present indings), and then in a workshop with Kolkata-based academics and civil 
servants in December 2009. The latter was useful in conirming that our methodological choices had not led us 
to panchayats that were social or political ‘outliers’.
7 The AITc emerged from a breakaway faction of  West Bengal’s congress party: it was founded in 1998 by 
Mamata Banerjee, who went on become chief  minister following the eventual defeat of  the cPI(M) in the 2011 
state assembly elections.
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Our ieldwork was undertaken after more than three decades of  panchayat-based 
development and welfare support, but the marginalised communities we worked with 
still sufered high levels of  material deprivation. Dubrajpur, in the drier west of  the 
district, was characterised by single-crop rice cultivation, meaning that the 41 per 
cent of  the population who were agricultural labourers also had to search for casual 
work as daily labourers in nearby brick factories, quarries or construction in the slack 
season. While some households had gained employment through the power plant, 
craft-based work (particularly carpentry and pottery) was in decline and outlying 
parts of  the panchayat remained underdeveloped – with households lacking metaled 
roads, electricity, water and sanitation. The dam supplying the plant’s water had also 
submerged agricultural land and housing, particularly that of  local Scheduled caste 
and Tribe households, leading to displacement and loss of  livelihoods. In Mayure-
swar-I, canal irrigation allowed double-cropping of  rice, alongside some vegetable 
production: 45 per cent of  the population were agricultural labourers, and other 
sources of  livelihood for poorer households included small-scale trade in vegetables, 
lowers and ishing, alongside domestic labour and some minor traditional artisanal 
production. National poverty-alleviation schemes in theory ofered routes out of  these 
precarious livelihoods (see Williams et al., 2012): up to 100 days’ work for registered 
unemployed households (via NREGP), credit for microenterprises based around self-
help groups (via the SGSY), and further support for the most deprived neighbor-
hoods (through the RSVY).8 As we will explore further below, the need to supplement 
precarious livelihoods with panchayat support shaped poorer households’ expression 
of  agency, but irst we outline the strategies local leaders used to control the political 
space created by decentralisation. Here, we outline three modes through which they 
exercised power: the establishment of  patronage networks, the assertion of  authority 
with its associated threat of  violence, and the surveillance and management of  the 
‘public sphere’.
8 The NREGP (the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme) followed a long line of  previous national 
programmes aiming to provide slack-season labour opportunities within public-works programmes, and the 
SGSY (Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana) was the latest incarnation of  national schemes to build up assets 
and skills for micro-enterprise among rural households. Both forms of  anti-poverty intervention had provided 
the mainstay of  the work implemented by village panchayats throughout the Left Front’s period in oice. RSVY 
(Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana), launched in 2004, aimed to support India’s most ‘backward’ districts: in West 
Bengal it primarily delivered infrastructure improvements, particularly to remote Scheduled Tribe settlements.
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Exercising power: controlling political space
Patronage and resource distribution
The irst, and perhaps most simple, form of  controlling political space was through 
building patronage networks. In both panchayats, this involved directing the distribu-
tion of  local government-controlled welfare beneits and development programmes, 
but also managing wider opportunities present within the local economy. In Dubra-
jpur, the cPI(M)’s continued electoral dominance made the party’s support vital 
to gaining access to various social support mechanisms and beneits distributed by 
the local panchayat, but there were important diferences between the ways in which 
its control over these resources was publicly portrayed and manner in which it was 
actually practised. The cPI(M) claimed to serve the whole panchayat, and to be particu-
larly supportive of  all poor households. As a result, party representatives never openly 
refused requests for help coming from the poor, and actively encouraged those who 
were not cPI(M) supporters to turn to the party for support. Through its mediation of  
these requests, the local cPI(M) publicly performed its equal treatment of  all people, 
and also claimed that its protection encompassed the entire population:
I am looking at the development of  the area’s people, area’s labouring people, tribal 
people, poor people, their work opportunities, or progress of  their inancial situation 
[…] Regarding our village panchayat, I should say that the leaders there have always 
stood beside our people. They always rush to help them in times of  need or danger. 
This is my only hope that whenever there is an incident in my own area, for example, 
a feud between the husband and the wife, and you call out for [cPI(M) party workers], 
they are there. I and my people can rely upon this. (Local cPI(M) leader, Dubrajpur, 
interview, 12 April 2009)
This self-portrayal deliberately refused to recognise the possible existence of  a ‘rival 
camp’ of  non-supporters. The execution of  this ‘universal’ patronage was, of  course, 
curtailed by the limited resources at the party’s disposal. In practice, beneits were 
distributed favouring those neighbourhoods and households which were of  strategic 
signiicance to the party’s electoral future, or those party supporters whose loyalty had 
been demonstrated over a long period of  time. Not only this, but all requests for help 
were mediated through the local party high command: oicial forums for deciding on 
the distribution of  beneits – such as village open meetings and the village develop-
ment committees – were therefore used to ‘consult’ the public, but decision-making 
power was held by the panchayat leader, and particularly the local party bosses.
This distribution of  government resources was leaving many people discontented, 
and some neighbourhoods and communities, particularly those physically distant from 
the panchayat oice, cut of. Here, party leaders’ control of  wider economic opportu-
nities within and beyond the panchayat area bolstered the reach of  their patronage. 
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The new generation of  party local leaders controlled access to bank loans and to 
temporary and unskilled employment in the power plant, and their clearance was also 
required to set up a new business in the panchayat’s economically developing hub. Of  
less absolute value, but critical to the livelihoods of  many poorer households, was the 
local cPI(M) committee secretary’s ability to provide people with labouring employ-
ment in neighbouring panchayats and elsewhere throughout Dubrajpur Block based on 
his social networks and political standing within the wider area. In this panchayat, those 
able to engage with India’s largest unemployment guarantee scheme, NREGP, were 
gaining on average only eighteen days’ work through it (interview with panchayat chair, 
10 April 2009) in a context where full-time agricultural work was plentiful for less than 
half  the year. The secretary’s ability to demonstrate that his support and inluence 
mattered in enabling (or denying) people access to other slack-season employment 
was therefore important in controlling poorer groups in outlying hamlets and villages 
receiving relatively few direct beneits from panchayat-administered programmes.
In Mayureswar, relationships between landowners and agricultural labourers 
created more ‘traditional’ forms of  patronage overlain by party politics. Landowners 
supplied thrift loans, regular agricultural employment and assistance in times of  crisis, 
in return for labourers’ loyalty in providing work according to their seasonal needs 
and votes at election time, binding both together in the relationships of  unequal but 
mutual support noted by Wood (2003). For poorer households, the security gained 
through maintaining these relationships was bought at the expense of  forgoing other 
opportunities: more ‘anonymous’ work under the NREGP may have been inancially 
attractive to labouring households, but if  there was any conlict of  interest here, poor 
households would not risk antagonising ‘their’ landowners simply to gain a few days 
of  government employment.
The combination of  agriculture-focused patronage networks and the panchayat’s 
electoral history meant that the distribution of  government resources was expected 
to be partisan, with neither political block aspiring to embrace to the whole of  the 
(poor) population. The panchayat’s ruling alliance selected only their own supporters as 
beneiciaries for key poverty-alleviation schemes, such as pensions, housing provision 
or help for destitute families. In 2008 they had deliberately manipulated an oicial 
household poverty survey that determined the distribution of  BPL (below poverty 
line) cards, the documents which entitled households to subsidised commodities and 
other beneits, in favour of  their supporters. Among other irregularities, this excluded 
an entire neighbourhood of  Scheduled caste ishermen known to support the cPI(M) 
from accessing BPL cards, something that was seen as neither out of  the ordinary nor 
particularly problematic by local civil servants:
last term another party [i.e. the cPI(M)] favoured a part of  the population who 
supported it for being in beneiciary lists, through active exclusion of  non-supporters. 
This time around, the opposite is happening. The ruling alliance will take care of  the 
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other half  that was excluded last time around from the beneiciary lists […] all is well 
for everyone. (Senior bureaucrat, Mayureswar-I Block oice, interview, 10 November 
2009)
Patronage was also expressed through NREGP work schemes: local leaders 
channelled these into redigging ponds on their own properties, thereby controlling 
both project-based employment and the additional opportunities that enhanced 
ish production allowed. By delivering locally visible projects that produced beneits 
distributed among their community, leaders reiterated their status as powerful, and 
thus sought-after, igures within their locality.
In both panchayats, the boundaries between oicial sources of  welfare support and 
informal practices of  patronage were deliberately blurred: all leaders would portray 
either form of  assistance equally, as the ‘gift’ of  the party/individual concerned, and 
the dependency this engendered was directly cultivated by leaders to keep people in 
a ‘close’ relationship with them. The key diference, of  course, was in the cPI(M)’s 
claim to be the only efective patron in Dubrajpur – a contrast with Mayureswar-I that 
was relected in the ways in which authority was projected in each.
Authority, mediation and violence
The cPI(M)’s dominance in Dubrajpur was not maintained through patronage alone, 
but through a wider projection of  its authority over all areas of  village life. Everyone, 
including the opposition leaders, knew that key decisions in their area needed to be 
referred to the cPI(M), which judged over matters from family disputes to the settling 
of  wage rates within the locality. The party could mediate this range of  activities in 
part by continually performing its presence through the regular conduct of  local party 
meetings at various levels ranging from the neighbourhood to the entire panchayat. 
These meetings were an important part of  the cPI(M)’s information feedback 
mechanism noted by Dasgupta (2009; see also Williams et al., 2003), and were used 
to persuade households of  the party’s value to them: giving advice to the poor, urging 
them to continue their trust in the party and highlighting their lack of  alternative 
sources of  support. At election time, this political pedagogy could shift from persua-
sion to coercion, with both senior party leaders and their subordinates adopting 
overtly forceful language. One of  our interviewees had been openly threatened by 
cPI(M) party workers who ‘said they would come after us after the votes are over’ 
(Scheduled caste female labourer, interview, 25 March 2009) if  her neighbourhood 
shifted its political allegiance in the 2008 panchayat polls. This resort to more open 
threats perhaps relected the cPI(M)’s anxieties surrounding these elections, given the 
AITc-led Alliance’s growing support both locally and across West Bengal. Whatever 
its cause, the change in the local party’s tone was widely noted, and resented:
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Earlier the cPI(M) leaders maintained close links with the local people and took care 
to visit the villages and were always on top of  things. The present leaders do not feel 
the need to come and meet the local people; rather the common people are supposed 
to approach them for help. The party leaders are no longer interested to stand by the 
side of  the people like in earlier times and often make false promises to the people. 
The common people are tired and fed up with the false promises and this lack of  faith 
was evident in the 2008 panchayat elections when the Left Front’s vote share got shrunk. 
These days, party leaders only visit the village before the elections. (Scheduled caste 
marginal farmer, interview, 26 March 2009) 
Whilst there was increasing dissatisfaction with the local party’s actions, the public 
perception of  its power and reach was suicient to stop open challenges to the party’s 
authority, and as a result threats of  violence remained more common than their actual use.
The Mayureswar-I panchayat, by contrast, saw more open contests over authority. 
Some of  these were explicitly ‘party-political’, and political feuds could turn extremely 
violent at panchayat election time: the congress ex-chairs of  the block council and local 
panchayat had allegedly been involved in a group who hacked a local cPI(M) leader 
to death in the year 2000. Open violence between congress and cPI(M) supporters 
forced our ieldwork to be temporarily suspended in late 2008, when membership of  
the panchayat’s village development councils was being decided. The irony here was 
that these councils were institutions intended to build transparency and consensus 
over development work at the village level. Other disputes had sources outside party 
politics – such as ights over family honour – but also reopened tensions between 
existing political factions within the gram panchayat.
Signiicantly, this violence was largely inter-elite, or aimed at those putting 
themselves forward as political leaders in the area, rather than being directed at the 
general public. Also, there were no claims that this constituted ‘legitimate’ behaviour: 
it was simply the open and aggressive settlement of  scores. As such, there was no 
attempt to subject people to party ‘discipline’ through the threat of  violence, as seen in 
Dubrajpur. Alongside this, because neither political camp staked a claim to complete 
dominance of  political space in Mayureswar-I, the opportunity remained for families 
to have disputes or other issues resolved through non-party agents such as community 
elders, senior schoolteachers and religious leaders. For example, community elders 
still played a role in mediating intra- and inter-family rivalry among landed house-
holds, and sometimes did so independently from party-political conlicts.
Surveillance and the control of public space
The monopoly over patronage networks, and the constant presence and projection 
of  the authority of  the party (backed by a generalised threat of  retribution) made the 
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cPI(M)’s control over political space in Dubrajpur stronger than that of  any party in 
Mayureswar-I. It was further reinforced by practices of  surveillance, with the general 
public, cPI(M) supporters and even junior party operatives aware that their public 
behaviour and statements would be observed. The party’s grass-roots meetings were 
important within these practices, but more generally party activists and aspirant leaders 
reported back to senior local cPI(M) igures. These reports included instances where 
people (including fellow party members) revealed their political sympathies through 
everyday activities such as complaining about resource distribution, accessing health 
and education or searching for work. This created a sense that it was not possible to 
act without the party’s knowledge, and people adjusted their public behaviour accord-
ingly, as a party worker from Dubrajpur explained:
Nobody declares opposition publicly […] I mean they [cPI(M) party leaders) will get 
to know whether we are in opposition as soon as we start speaking. Many people thus 
remain quiet at village open meetings, and do not involve themselves in party politics 
openly. (Scheduled caste cPI(M) party worker, interview, 7 April 2009) 
People would therefore seek out a cPI(M) party leader or resource person to 
settle local conlicts, as seeking resolution through any other means would be read as 
challenging party authority within their neighbourhood. In one example reported to 
us, this even included seeking the party’s support in proceeding with a divorce (Sched-
uled caste self-employed male, interview, 24 March 2009). In addition, any criticism 
of  the local council’s role was carefully guarded. Within those neighbourhoods where 
the opposition parties had made signiicant inroads in the latest panchayat elections, 
complaints about the cPI(M) were heard in public spaces, such as informal village 
gatherings, or in the community halls where our focus group discussions took place. 
However, when it came to raising their voices in the panchayat’s formal platforms for 
public participation, the village development committee or ward-level open meetings, 
the same people were careful to censor their speech in front of  people from outside 
the village who might report back to the party.
The collection of  chanda, the ‘voluntary’ contribution to party funds, provided 
an additional check on people’s loyalty to the cPI(M). The sums involved were not 
insigniicant – more than half  a labourer’s daily wage – and all households and local 
businesses were approached by local party workers at least once a year for payment. 
Where households could not provide cash, party members would collect two kilos 
of  rice instead, and households would sometimes help out poorer neighbours with 
payment. Non-payment, particularly if  spread across a group of  households, was, 
however, seen as deiance of  party authority, and would label the neighbourhood 
concerned as political opponents.
Given the weaker control of  all parties over the public sphere in Mayureswar-
I, surveillance of  people’s behaviour was more limited. In the oicial platforms for 
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engagement with the afairs of  the panchayat such as ward-level open meetings, any 
participation from members of  the public would be overtly ‘political’, in that requests 
for help, or criticisms of  council actions, would directly label the speaker in terms of  
her/his party loyalty. Away from these formal meetings, however, there was far less 
sense of  political loyalties being observed, except through the collection of  chanda. 
Here, all parties sought donations, and households faced no pressure to donate to 
the Alliance just because it controlled the panchayat board. Households gave money in 
hope that this would deliver support from the relevant political party if  needed, and 
this was seen as a form of  social insurance that reinforced existing relationships to 
their chosen patrons.
These practices of  exercising power in Dubrajpur and Mayureswar outline impor-
tant diferences in the local management of  political space, but also raise important 
questions about their impacts for the poor in expressing their political agency and 
meeting their livelihood needs. We therefore turn now to poorer people’s strategies to 
negotiate within these highly politicised spaces.
Spaces for poor people’s agency
Dubrajpur: working within the space of the party
The tight control of  public space within Dubrajpur by the cPI(M) undoubtedly set 
the ‘organisational grid’ (Bhattacharyya, 2009) within which all households had to 
operate: access to power was mediated through the local party and its grass-roots 
operatives, and so poor people’s strategies centred on building relationships with 
them. For those fortunate enough to be part of  the core support group of  energetic 
party activists, single-party dominance was undoubtedly working to their advantage. 
The newly elected cPI(M) panchayat member of  one of  our case study groups had 
built strong support among poorer families within his own (Muslim) community, and 
was praised for the close attention he paid to their needs: ‘Whenever there is anything 
urgent, or we are in need of  money, he takes us in, he helps us’ (labourer’s wife, inter-
view, 26 February 2009). He also managed to ensure that his neighbourhood was 
well represented within panchayat beneiciary lists, despite the fact that poorer parts of  
his own electoral ward were not, and was active in contacting the panchayat oice on 
households’ behalf. In return, villagers were happy to route all their requests for help 
through him, and to turn up in numbers whenever a public show of  his standing or 
support for the cPI(M) was required.
For poor hamlets and neighbourhoods less central to the interests of  local party 
activists, loyalty to the cPI(M) was no guarantee of  such beneits. In one isolated 
hamlet made up of  Santal (Scheduled Tribe) and Muslim households, the cPI(M) 
had managed to gain the political support of  the Santal community by making their 
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community headman a member of  the party’s village committee, the lowest tier of  the 
party’s hierarchal network of  organisations. He clearly took his role of  representing 
the community’s interests seriously, and the whole Santal population conscientiously 
voted for the party, but it appeared that the cPI(M) had bought this support relatively 
cheaply. He had no inluence within party meetings, and the hamlet had seen little 
beneit from development programmes, even though it was oicially labelled as 
deserving support under RSVY, the programme for destitute areas. For any assistance 
around the workings of  government, the whole hamlet instead turned for advice to 
a local Muslim leader who was a retired secretary of  a neighbouring panchayat: he in 
turn was careful to be discrete about his own congress-supporting background.
For those neighbourhoods openly identiied with the political opposition, things 
were undoubtedly more di cult. One community of  lower-caste potters had one 
of  its members beaten up for his public support of  the AITc, but they had been 
resourceful in dealing with the resulting political isolation from the cPI(M). They 
sought economic support from the secretary of  the local agricultural cooperative 
society, a wealthy congress supporter who provided them with jobs and thrift loans in 
times of  need, but at the same time made a show of  publicly backing a local cPI(M) 
leader as secretary of  the ward’s village development committee. The villagers knew 
that this cPI(M) member was corrupt – the party had publicly beaten him for theft 
of  wages from a panchayat work scheme – but also knew that he was both close to 
their supporter in the cooperative society, and well connected to the local cPI(M) 
committee secretary, universally recognised as the most signiicant power broker in 
the panchayat.9 This, they argued, was their best chance of  keeping peace with the 
party. Other ‘opposition’ communities responding less strategically had been cut 
of by the party altogether. One Scheduled caste community had openly voiced its 
support for the AITc in the 2008 elections, and had been punished as a result by being 
completely excluded from panchayat work programmes despite its status as an RSVY 
target hamlet.
Mayureswar-I: maintaining security amid political flux
In our Mayureswar-I panchayat, poorer households again needed to position themselves 
relative to local power brokers, but within a situation of  longer-term political lux. 
Because no single party was dominant, individuals had some freedom to switch their 
party alliances, and both Scheduled caste and Scheduled Tribe households sought 
to exploit this. In the 2008 elections, the position of  panchayat chair had been reserved 
9 The committee secretary was recognised as the pradhan chalak, a widely used term in West Bengal to denote 
‘the power behind the throne’. The Bengali phrase is, however, far more derogatory: the pradhan is the panchayat 
chairman, and a chalak is the driver of  a bullock cart, the implication being that the chairman was a draft animal 
under the yoke of  the committee secretary.
Managing political space: authority, marginalised people’s agency and governance in West Bengal 17
for a Scheduled Tribe candidate, and the congress had installed BH, a local Santali 
man, under the tutelage of  the party’s senior local leader, who came from a long-
established higher-caste landholding family. BH secured a range of  beneits for 
families in his own hamlet, including government house-building loans, and old-age 
and tribal development pensions. Many in BH’s hamlet openly criticised the outgoing 
panchayat oice holders, who had allegedly ignored the neighbourhood’s needs, with 
one women claiming that she had been equally vocal to cPI(M) activists at election 
time, threatening to drive them away from her house with a broom. For new (and 
existing) congress supporters in the neighbourhood, public displays of  their support, 
and maintaining close contact with BH, were not optional, but performances vital in 
maintaining their longer-term security:
Q: If  you fall sick, what do you do?
A: I go to the party; you have to join the party to get something done … Either that, 
or you would have to manage 500 rupees to go to the hospital. And if  you are sick you 
might have to pay out 500 or 1,000 rupees depending on how much they charge you. If  
you don’t pay, you don’t receive treatment. I am not blaming the party, I simply don’t 
have the money, so I have to carry on like this. This is what happens if  you are too poor. 
(Landless Scheduled Tribe man, interview, 24 March 2009)
Here, and elsewhere across the panchayat, it was clear that poorer households were 
trying to maintain relationships with both political parties, with some households 
even containing individuals who were actively campaigning for each. More common, 
however, was to work through a set of  local intermediaries: in one mixed-community 
village, Scheduled caste and Scheduled Tribe households relied on the more inluen-
tial of  their high-caste neighbours, both directly for work on their ields, and in using 
their more extensive social networks to petition help from either political party. Poor 
but higher-caste or Muslim households in the area generally used their own social 
networks to approach the families of  the local congress leadership for support, rather 
than the panchayat directly. In part this relected the real power held by the leadership, 
but also their social discomfort in petitioning a political representative from the tribal 
community for help: when they did need to deal with the panchayat, they did so through 
intermediaries.
Some households were not able to switch political allegiances so easily. One of  
our focus neighbourhoods was a Scheduled caste community that had been particu-
larly close to the cPI(M) during its time in oice, and had received various beneits 
(including some households gaining an electricity connection) for being so. Not only 
this, but many households were sharecroppers who had been involved in the tenancy-
reform struggles of  the early years of  the Left Front government, and were tenants 
of  powerful upper-caste leaders of  the local cPI(M). These families were thus unable 
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to tactically reinvent their political ailiation: they could draw on the wider political 
connections of  their landlords, but were cut of from any panchayat support for the 
foreseeable future. For these people, and others like this Scheduled caste widow, any 
attempt to renegotiate their access to the new power holders was likely to be met with 
a degree of  public humiliation:
The congress never cares for us […] if  we ask them for any help they say, ‘You voted 
for the cPI(M) – go and ask them for your help’. The pradhan [panchayat chair] says, 
‘Why didn’t the cPI(M) help you out?’ […] We can’t say anything more, and have to 
keep silent. (Scheduled caste widow, interview, 27 February 2009)
Ultimately, the implicit local rules of  political patronage were widely known: ‘swing 
voters’ were no doubt wise to talk up the support they had given to the Alliance in 
the 2008 panchayat elections, but this in itself  was not a strategy that would necessarily 
deliver results:
Only those who actively work for the party get help, and those who cannot spare sui-
cient time for the party to attend all the meetings get nothing. This is the condition of  
our panchayat. (Lower-caste respondent, interview, 28 February 2009)
Even when it could be accessed, this ‘help’ often came at a price: the corruption of  
elected panchayat representatives of  all parties was spontaneously mentioned by many 
interviewees, and they were clearly extracting rents from the government resources 
at their disposal. Gaining a ‘below poverty line’ ration card was not only restricted to 
those who had shown political support, but was also reported as costing 500 rupees 
to ‘arrange’ (a sum equivalent to around a week’s agricultural wages at that time). 
Those ofered government house-building loans were similarly asked to give a cut of  
up to 40 per cent of  the total loan amount. The openness with which these igures 
were discussed indicated the frustration that most poorer households had experienced 
by inding themselves on the wrong side of  the panchayat’s changing political divide. 
Similar cuts were certainly being taken in our Dubrjapur panchayat:10 people’s relative 
reticence in mentioning them was due to the continued dominance of  the cPI(M) 
there, and its consequences for those who spoke out.
10 Although open discussion of  this was more circumspect than in Mayureswar, Durbrajpur’s cPI(M) workers 
also requested that beneiciaries give them a cut of  any government resources received, but presented this as 
a de-personalised ‘party donation’. This was a structured form of  corruption which attempted to build some 
sense of  legitimacy for this action (the money would help the party’s good works for the poor), whilst making the 
ultimate distribution of  this cut within the party untraceable to those ‘donating’ it.
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Structuring political space: implications for 
governance reform
The ieldwork has conirmed that earlier ethnographic accounts are right to focus on 
political parties as key actors in West Bengal, but has pushed this analysis further by 
illustrating the diferent modes through which rule is practised and the implications of  
this for poor people’s agency. Our two case-study panchayats showed important difer-
ences in both regards, which we present in a stylised form in Table 1. The cPI(M) in 
Dubrajpur was attempting to maintain a more complete domination of  the panchayat’s 
politics and public space than either party grouping could aspire to in Mayureswar-I. 
The local cPI(M)’s ambitions were extensive in the range of  afairs and people (the 
entire panchayat population) over which it aimed to exercise its authority. A key difer-
ence between the panchayats was the heightened level of  surveillance experienced (or 
perceived) within Dubrajpur: there was a palpable sense that the party would come 
to know about anything said or done in public that was in any way ‘political’. These 
diferences are an important reminder that although West Bengal’s political culture 
was dominated by the cPI(M) for over three decades, practices of  the party ‘machine’ 
varied signiicantly on the ground. From the perspective of  those engaging with it at a 
local level, the cPI(M) was either an all-dominating presence, or merely one of  several 
competing sources of  political patronage. Explaining and structuring these difer-
ences, however, we can see some common underlying elements to the political logic 
of  both panchayats that provide answers to the two questions posed within this paper.
We begin with the question of  how political decentralisation afects the ways in 
which authority is exercised. For chatterjee, West Bengal’s panchayats opened up a 
‘ield of  negotiations’ between citizens and a local state that was expected to deliver 
developmental beneits: this was visible from our ieldwork, but here we wish to make 
two important observations about how this space was managed. First, as suggested 
by Lund (2006a; 2006b), performances matter: leaders secured their rule by stitching 
together the roles of  feudal patron, political boss and moral patriarch to project a 
uniied and generic sense of  authority. Government programmes and grants were 
thus presented as being the ‘gift’ of  particular leaders in Mayureswar, or in Dubrajpur 
of  ‘the party’, an entity which was deliberately hazily deined to maintain its aura 
of  omnipotence. Importantly, however, power came not only from exchanging these 
‘gifts’ for electoral support: eicacy, a key attribute of  ‘big men’, was also demon-
strated through leaders’ ability to deploy their contacts, to settle disputes, or to extract 
the ‘quasi-tax’ of  political subscriptions, and these abilities were equally important in 
displaying and shoring up their control. The resources needed to back these perfor-
mances were therefore not merely those of  the local state itself, but also extended to 
the social capital of  the leaders concerned.
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Table 1 Authority and agency in the case-study panchayats
Dubrajpur Mayureswar-I
P
o
w
e
r 
h
o
ld
e
rs
’ 
m
o
d
e
s 
o
f 
E
xe
rc
is
in
g
 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
Patronage Resources largely monopolised by 
CPI(M). Distribution presented as 
supporting everyone across the whole 
panchayat, but is partial in practice.
Private resources split across rival 
landowner-based support groups. 
Overtly partisan distribution of state 
resources by party in power.
Coercion Generalised and coordinated threats 
against anyone opposing the CPI(M), 
presented as maintaining discipline: 
actual violence rare
Violent rivalry between political actors 
based on retribution, not claims to 
moral authority: threats not directed at 
the general public
Surveillance Strong – CPI(M) leaders create the 
impression that they are aware of 
all acts and speech throughout the 
panchayat, leading to widespread self-
censorship by voters.
Weak – voters’ self-censorship is 
largely restricted to formal public 
arenas: open criticism of politicians is 
far more commonplace elsewhere
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‘Key 
supporters’
Public performances of loyalty to the 
CPI(M), developing/ maintaining good 
links to key power brokers. 
Public performances of loyalty to the 
AITC, clear expectations of material 
support in return.
‘Political 
neutrals’
Attempts to build links with well-placed 
CPI(M) figures and hide any other 
political connections
Opportunities to lobby and/or switch 
allegiance to new power holders
‘Political 
rivals’
Highly restricted – limited to covert 
searches for alternative sources of 
support 
No expectations of access to govern-
ment support: reliance on rival CPI(M) 
patrons for non-state-based forms of 
support
Second, localised competition over Bengal’s panchayats has created a political 
ield in which any attempt to assert authority publicly was drawn into the arena of  
party rivalry. In Dubrajpur, the cPI(M)’s subtly invasive exercise of  power could be 
practised precisely because the party had long enjoyed local electoral dominance, and 
could exercise this in a disciplined and disciplining manner under the overall leader-
ship of  the local committee secretary. In Mayureswar-I, the same logic in less stable 
conditions produced personalisation of  patronage, and open rivalry and dramatic 
violence. This qualiies and develops earlier research on West Bengal’s ‘party society’, 
importantly seeing this not merely as resulting from the cPI(M) itself, but rather as a 
systemic efect of  West Bengal’s institutionalisation of  party-politicised panchayat rule. 
With the creation of  an electoral majority being a central concern of  anyone who 
aimed to exercise power from the ward level upwards, local leaders of  all parties had 
an interest in framing their actions within the context of  inter-party competition.
Turning to the spaces this leaves open for poor people’s agency, these structuring 
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elements of  local political society have important outcomes for the poor, relected in 
the lower half  of  Table 1. For everyone, but particularly for poor and marginalised 
groups directly dependent on the support of  patrons, identity was inescapably bound 
up with public perceptions of  party support. This was often rather coarsely grained, 
with whole neighbourhoods or local caste groups being labelled as key supporters, 
political neutrals or rivals, and as such poorer households had limited control over the 
political identities ascribed to them. Poor people expressed agency in working around 
these identities, making public displays of  loyalty to a particular party, or aiming to 
reposition themselves vis-à-vis the local ‘ixers’ that would give them better access to 
those in power. In Dubrajpur, the dangers inherent in being explicitly labelled as an 
opposition supporter meant that this agency was primarily expressed by seeking out 
better links to the cPI(M) publicly, and/or to non-cPI(M) potential patrons far more 
covertly. In Mayureswar-I, electoral luidity meant that there were greater oppor-
tunities for some neighbourhoods or communities to ‘cross the loor’, reinventing 
themselves as keen supporters of  the incoming alliance.
With their agency constrained within this frame of  party identity, poor households 
negotiated local power relations through everyday practices which often did little to 
support their wider strategic interests. Repositioning one’s community relative to a 
particular party did not challenge underlying structures of  patronage, and it is perhaps 
signiicant that in Dubrajpur poor households were often willing to report neighbours’ 
behaviour to local cPI(M) activists in order to secure their own support. The inal cruel 
fact remains that however actively poor people tried to tactically position themselves 
within this space, they had no guarantee of  success. In any panchayat, some of  these 
micro-constituencies were simply ignored by the party in power locally: they were 
deemed to be irreparably linked to opposition patrons and ixers, or worse still simply 
irrelevant to the calculus of  gaining an electoral majority. Being a ‘political outcast’ 
in this sense mattered far beyond the label itself, having very real consequences for 
households’ access to a range of  oicial and unoicial forms of  social security. In 
contrast to James Scott’s depiction of  the moral economy of  rural Malaysia, poorer 
villagers’ ability to request charity and support from their more powerful neighbours 
was therefore limited according to their value in party-political struggles, thus severely 
blunting these ‘weapons of  the weak’ (Scott, 1985).
As such, this study of  local politics has wider lessons for the study of  intentional 
governance reform. First, following Fox (1996), attempts to change the institutional 
architecture need to relect on their situation within and contribution to the historical 
‘layering up’ of  local political space. Thus the development of  panchayat rule under the 
Left Front has to be understood both as a response to the challenges facing the cPI(M) 
from the late 1970s, and as profoundly reshaping the structure and conduct of  local 
politics. More generally, any programme for empowered participatory governance 
should recognise that it does not work on a blank slate, but rather with formal institu-
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tions whose actual operation is inevitably hybridised with other parts of  a complex 
local political landscape. Our own analysis, echoing that of  Lemanski (2017), has 
emphasised the spatiality of  this landscape, with governance reform restructuring the 
range over which institutions operate, the terrain over which rule is contested and the 
identity of  communities.
Second, the double shift in perspective that we have proposed here, in focusing on 
local political space, and in treating formal and informal practices of  rule on an equal 
footing, is one of  theoretical and practical importance. conditions on the ground 
certainly indicate the inadequacy of  hiving of ‘formal’ governance structures as a 
self-contained unit of  study: panchayat resources helped to shore up the authority of  
political leaders, who in turn provided services – such as dispute resolution – which the 
developmental state simply could not undertake itself. Following Blom Hansen (2004) 
we could see this as not simply ‘corruption’ but a relection of  the incompleteness of  
formal authority in contemporary India: oicial practices of  rule remained linked 
to and dependent on ‘informal sovereignty’. More widely, we need to recognise the 
importance of  leaders’ performances in stitching together this symbiosis, deliberately 
blurring the actions of  political parties, private patronage and the oicial duties of  the 
state when establishing their authority and exercising power.
Equally, the exclusion felt by the ‘political outcasts’ and curtailed agency of  other 
groups of  poor households was not a relic of  a premodern social order, but rather was 
an inherent product of  a system of  electoral competition brought in through panchayat 
rule. Not only did this sharply contrast with the normative ideal of  the rights-bearing 
citizen promoted within ideas of  empowered participatory governance, but it also 
qualiies and develops ideas of  ‘governed populations’ within chatterjee’s formula-
tion of  political society. Poor households were aware of  the importance of  conforming 
to governmental categories to gain access to state beneits and programmes, and ixers 
and intermediaries were sought out to achieve these goals. However, it should be 
recognised that their struggles did not merely encompass gaining resources of  the 
local state, but also access to efective dispute resolution, and privately provided work, 
credit and other forms of  social security. More broadly, the fact that many poorer 
villagers saw panchayat beneits as ‘gifts’ instead of  the outcome of  government bodies 
fulilling their statutory duties towards them was not mere ignorance of  how formal 
structures of  governance should work. Rather, they knew that they had to rely on 
local ixers and leaders to access a range of  resources, whether public or private, and 
as such were providing a reasoned analysis of  how hybridised governance structures 
actually worked in practice.
These theoretical insights should temper the enthusiasm with which ‘good-gover-
nance’ interventions are promoted in the global South. Those expecting to restructure 
local governance practices need to recognise that it is only the formal state that can be 
easily made subject to programmes of  reform. Even when such reform is sought in the 
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name of  the poor, relationships with the formal state are unlikely to be poorer groups’ 
sole cause of  concern. Much of  the world inds itself  in a situation of  ongoing ‘state 
scarcity’, where maintaining (or seeking to create) social ties with ‘big men’ might 
be very important to day-to-day survival, and engagement with oicial mechanisms 
of  participatory governance of  secondary concern. As such, understanding how 
everyday practices of  rule are experienced and negotiated ‘from below’ is an impor-
tant irst step in identifying pathways towards more democratic local governance.
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